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Cut-Off Points for Depletion Purposes 
BY CHARLES F . REINHARDT 
Partner, Los Angeles Office 
Presented at Tax Meeting of the National West-
ern Mining Conference, Denver — April 1960 
ALL OF us who deal with the determination of the taxable income and 
tax liability of an enterprise are well aware that the entire field 
is confused. About the only things certain are that taxes are too high, 
relief is not in sight, and that the rules, law, and regulations are be-
coming more complicated. 
It seems that the mining industry is one that has more than its 
share of problems. We have to know what expenditures are explora-
tion, when exploration stops and development begins, when develop-
ment stops and operation begins, what type of property right con-
stitutes an economic interest, what properties shall be aggregated, 
what rate of percentage depletion applies, what is gross income from 
the property, what is net income from the property, and what is the 
cut-off point. 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss cut-off points. Normally a 
mine owner extracts the ore or other natural resource and must apply 
a number of treatment processes before the material extracted is ready 
for sale. Frequently mine owners do not sell the material until it has 
undergone a considerable amount of processing. Some of these 
processes are basic and are needed to obtain something that is saleable, 
whereas in other cases the process may be thought akin to manu-
facturing. The determination of a cut-off point becomes important to 
find out how much of the income realized may become the base on 
which depletion can be computed. 
The Internal Revenue Code provides that percentage depletion 
shall be allowed at a specified rate on gross income from the property. 
The Code further states that gross income from the property means the 
gross income from mining. The term mining is defined as "including 
not merely the extraction of the ores or minerals from the ground but 
also the ordinary treatment processes normally applied by mine 
owners or operators to obtain the commercially marketable product or 
products and transportation of ores or minerals from the point of 
extraction from the ground to the plants or mills in which the ordinary 
treatment processes are applied." (Transportation values for distances 
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in excess of 50 miles may be denied.) The Code also defines ordinary 
treatment processes. 
In its simplest form a cut-off point may occur if a mine owner or 
operator applies a process not specifically mentioned in the Code to 
the ore or mineral before he sells the ore or mineral. It then becomes 
necessary to consider each unnamed process and ascertain if it is a 
mining or a manufacturing process. If it is concluded that such 
process is truly a mining process it should be allowable and the value 
of the ore and mineral after such treatment is recognized. 
Most of the litigation before the courts is based on the question 
of whether certain processes applied by taxpayers to their ores or 
minerals represent ordinary treatment processes, manufacturing 
processes necessary to obtain a saleable product, or manufacturing 
processes applied to upgrade a saleable product. It appears desirable 
to recite the facts in a few of these cases and then try to draw a few 
conclusions from them. 
COAL 
I do not know how much interest, if any, you people have in the 
cut-off problems of taxpayers engaged in the coal mining industry. 
There was a situation several years ago in the coal industry, relating 
to allowable processes, which is related to a real problem now facing 
the uranium mining industry, and I think it should be discussed. 
Prior to World War II, a number of coal producers found that it 
appeared desirable to treat bituminous coal with a fine spray of oil 
for the purpose of allaying dust. This treatment enabled coal pro-
ducers to sell domestic stoker coal on a more competitive basis with 
oil or gas. 
One of these coal producers, Black Mountain Corporation, com-
puted its depletion on the market price it received for its coal whether 
oil-treated or not. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue held that 
depletion could not be allowed on the increased value of the coal as a 
result of the oil spraying, as such treatment was not a mining process. 
Deficiencies of less than $800 were determined for each of the years 
1948 and 1949. Testimony filed with the Tax Court showed that from 
1940 to 1949 less than 10 per cent of the bituminous coal produced was 
so treated and less than 10 per cent of the coal mines oil-sprayed coal. 
The Tax Court, in its decision promulgated on February 25, 1954, held 
that the oil spraying was not an ordinary treatment process. The 
proceeds attributable to such process could not be included in gross 
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income from the property for the purpose of computing percentage 
depletion. 
The impact of this decision was shown to Congress and in the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, enacted in August 1954, Congress 
amended the law regarding the ordinary treatment processes appli-
cable to coal mining. The section dealing with coal provided that dust 
allaying and treating to prevent freezing are considered ordinary 
treatment processes. 
Thus Congress, by statute, provided that those operators who oil-
sprayed coal for purposes of allaying dust could compute depletion 
on gross income including any portion attributable to the dust-allaying 
treatment. Congress, by statute, designated the dust-allaying process 
as an ordinary treatment process in the sense that it became an allow-
able process. It seems important to note also that Congress took this 
step in spite of the fact only a small portion of the coal was so treated. 
It seems clear also that any coal producer could apply one of the dust-
allaying processes and not find he was confronted with a cut-off point. 
U R A N I U M 
Uranium mining has come of age within the last twenty years. 
Its growth was accelerated by the vast amount of research in the war 
period that resulted in the atomic bomb. 
The industry, as I understand it, differs from the other metal mine 
industries in that many of its members are relatively small operators 
and are not integrated producers such as we find in the copper mining 
industry. 
Through the Atomic Energy Commission, government control of 
the market has had an important effect on the industry. For example, 
the A E C buys the concentrates, yellow cake, which it processes to 
obtain the end products. It also has purchased the ore in certain 
quantities in order to stimulate the search for and development of new 
sources of ore. A date has been set after which the A E C will no longer 
purchase anything but the concentrates. 
The concentrating process is a fairly expensive one and an im-
portant investment is required for such a plant. Some mine owners 
can operate such plants and sell their concentrates in acceptable form. 
Other mine owners either have to sell their ore to concentrators or 
perhaps contract with others to perform the concentrating. 
Concentrating of ores has long been treated as an ordinary mining 
process. It has been so specified in the appropriate sections of the 
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Internal Revenue Code. It is my understanding that the Internal 
Revenue Service ruled privately that the proper cut-off point for the 
purpose of determining gross income from the property for the deple-
tion computation was at the point where the concentrated ore or yellow 
cake was obtained. About a year ago, I understand that a Revenue 
Agent in this area took the position the cut-off should be made prior 
to the concentrating process. The matter was not resolved locally and 
I am informed that the question was presented to the National Office 
of the Internal Revenue Service. As of a recent date no answer had 
been issued to the local Revenue Agent's office in spite of the fact the 
Internal Revenue Code clearly states concentrating is an ordinary 
treatment process for metal mines. 
CHEMICAL AND M E T A L L U R G I C A L LIMESTONE 
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue has contended that tax-
payers engaged in the production and sale of chemical or metallurgical 
grade limestone have a cut-off problem. The Centropolis Crusher 
Company case illustrates this problem. 
The taxpayer mined, processed, and sold chemical and metallurgi-
cal limestone. The named processes were blasting, hauling to primary 
crusher, primary crushing, secondary crushing or grinding, automatic 
screening, and grinding in a roller mill. The entire process was auto-
matic and resulted in the production of eight sizes ranging from two 
inch to fine ground (the latter portion passing a 200-mesh screen). The 
taxpayer bagged a small portion of the fine ground stone. 
About 80 per cent of the sales were of crushed rock and only 20 
per cent of the sales were of the fine ground material. The 80 per cent 
of sales were made at an average price of $1.50 per ton whereas the 
remainder was sold at an average price of $5.00 per ton. Upon appeal 
to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the representatives of 
the Commissioner contended that the fine grinding was a process 
applied after a commercially marketable product had been obtained. 
They argued that it could not be allowed as a mining process. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the District Court 
and held that all of the processing constituted ordinary treatment 
processes. Revenue from bagging was disallowed as an item of gross 
income from the property. 
The representatives of the Commissioner pointed out what they 
conceived was an inconsistency in the Iowa Limestone Company case 
wherein it was held that the fine ground material (substantially all of 
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the sales) was the first commercially marketable product. It was their 
view that all producers of chemical and metallurgical grade limestone 
should be required to compute gross income at the same cut-off point 
regardless of processes employed. 
The Court rejected the idea that there was only one commercially 
marketable product. It pointed out that Section 114(b)(4)(B) of the 
Internal Revenue Code referred to "the ordinary treatment processes 
normally applied by mine owners or operators in order to obtain the 
commercially marketable mineral product or products." 
LIMESTONE FOR C E M E N T 
There have been a number of cases dealing with the cut-off point 
in the cement industry. Some of these cases are Dragon Cement Co. 
Inc., Monolith Portland Cement Co., Riverside Cement Co., and California 
Portland Cement Co. 
Limestone used for the manufacture of cement became eligible for 
percentage depletion in 1951. The rate was fixed at 10 per cent which 
was subsequently increased to 15 per cent in 1954. The Internal 
Revenue Service stated that it would allow percentage depletion com-
puted on the value of the stone as it entered the kiln where it was 
burned to form a clinker. The clinker was subjected to a finish-
grinding process later to produce finished cement. The value was 
determinable under the proportionate-cost theory which I will discuss 
later. Depletion generally was computed and allowed on this basis. 
Subsequently, as a result of the decision in the Cherokee Brick and 
Tile Company case, cement companies filed claims for refund based on 
the position finished cement was the first commercially marketable 
product and, on rejection thereof, filed suits in the various District 
Courts. The results have been favorable to the taxpayers. 
In the Dragon case the District Court held that the first com-
mercially marketable product was the finished cement. It was further 
held that the charge for placing cement in bags was properly includible 
in gross income from the property. The decision was affirmed by the 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The Supreme Court declined 
to take jurisdiction. 
The Monolith case was tried in a District Court in California and 
the Court held that finished cement was the first commercially mar-
ketable product. It was held, however, that gross income from the 
property did not include the charge for bags. It was further held that 
a discount of 20 cents per barrel must be charged against income from 
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the property. The decision of the District Court was affirmed by the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
The Riverside case was heard in the same District Court as the 
Monolith case. The Court held also that the first commercially mar-
ketable product was finished cement and that gross income from the 
property included the charge for cement in bags and that the discount 
of 20 cents per bag was a cash discount not chargeable against gross 
income from the property. The case was taken to the Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit but was settled out of court. 
The California case was also tried in the same District Court in 
California as the Monolith and Riverside cases. It was also held that 
the first commercially marketable product was finished cement. It 
also was held that gross income from the property included the charge 
for loading cement in bags and that the discount was a cash discount 
not required to be charged to gross income from the property. The 
California case is now on appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court. 
It might seem inconsistent that the same court would hold differ-
ently on the bagging and discount issues for Monolith than for the 
other two companies. Actually Monolith in the year under trial was 
limited to a deduction based on 50 per cent of net income from the 
property. Its case showed bagging costs to be greater than the bagging 
charge made to customers so that its depletion deduction was greater 
if it did not make an argument as to these points. This position 
presumably would not prejudice its position in later years as the other 
two cases were decided subsequently to the Monolith case. 
FIRE C L A Y 
There have been several cases decided by the various courts re-
garding cut-off points for fire clay, brick, and tile clay. At the present 
time there is one important case on the calendar of the Supreme Court. 
It is now expected that the case will come to trial sometime in May 
1960 and it concerns the Cannelton Sewer Pipe Company. The per-
tinent facts are set forth hereinafter. 
The taxpayer owned deposits of fire clay and shale in and around 
Cannelton, Indiana. It extracted the fire clay and shale from these 
deposits and applied the processes necessary to produce vitrified sewer 
pipe and related products. During the year 1951, for which the claim 
for refund was filed, the taxpayer produced about 38,500 tons of clay 
and processed all but 80 tons of ground clay into vitrified clay sewer 
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pipe and related burnt-clay products. The taxpayer never sold raw 
fire clay or shale and it never purchased any for use in its processing 
activities. In the presentation of its case the Government produced 
evidence to the effect that more than 25 per cent of the fire clay 
produced in 1951 was sold in the raw state and as to that produced 
in Indiana that year about 60 per cent was sold in the raw state. 
Testimony presented at the trial in the District Court for the 
Southern District of Indiana indicated that the raw clay and shale was 
mined in several ways in the area. Some producers were operating by 
strip mining methods incidental to and in conjunction with strip 
mining of coal. Another group of operators strip-mined the clay which 
had been laid bare by previous operators. These types of operation 
differed considerably from that of the taxpayer which operated an 
underground mine. Evidence presented to the Court indicated that the 
various strip miners could and did sell clay in the area for a delivered 
price ranging from $1.60 to $1.90 per ton. The taxpayer could not 
compete in this market as its mining costs alone were about $2.40 per 
ton. It was also asserted that the strip miners could not sell all their 
production at the above-named prices. 
Depletion granted at 15 per cent to the strip miners who sold raw 
clay at $1.60 to $1.90 per ton would amount to $0.24 to $0.285 per ton. 
The taxpayer computed depletion on its sales on the basis of 15 per 
cent as to 60 per cent of its gross income (fire clay) and on the basis of 
5 per cent as to 40 per cent of its gross income (shale). The weighted 
depletion deduction was $4.03 per ton. 
The District Court denied the argument made by the Government 
that the field price of raw clay should fix the amount of gross income 
on which depletion should be computed and held for the taxpayer. The 
case was taken to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and 
that Court issued its opinion on June 15, 1959 affirming the decision of 
the lower court. Subsequently the Government petitioned for a writ 
of certiorari which was granted by the Supreme Court. 
Recently the National Coal Association has requested permission 
to file a brief amicus curiae in the Cannelton Sewer Pipe Company case. 
It is my understanding that the concern of the National Coal Associa-
tion arises from the fact that the Commissioner's representatives in 
arguing for a cut-off point at the raw-clay stage were denying the 
taxpayer the right to compute value after crushing and grinding 
which are named processes. This approach, if upheld, would appear to 
jeopardize the present status of ordinary treatment processes of coal. 
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COMMENTS REGARDING T H E CITED CASES 
The issue in the coal company case was whether a taxpayer had 
the obligation to exclude from gross income any benefit derived from 
a process not specifically classed as an ordinary treatment process. The 
oil spraying was applied prior to the loading which was a treatment 
approved by statute. The oil spraying was not done to obtain a higher 
price for the coal but in order to permit sales to a type of customer not 
otherwise available to the taxpayer. It would appear that this oil 
spraying should have been regarded as an ordinary treatment process. 
The Tax Court did not so hold and Congress later specified in the 
Internal Revenue Code that dust allaying was an ordinary treatment 
process. 
In the chemical and metallurgical limestone case the issue ap-
peared to be, "What is the meaning of grinding as an ordinary treat-
ment process?" The Internal Revenue Code defines crushing and 
grinding as an ordinary treatment process. It also allows pulverization 
of talc to be classed as an ordinary treatment process. The taxpayer 
had to fine-grind about 20 per cent of its output in order to sell it. If 
one turns to the dictionary for an answer it is probable that he will 
conclude, as I did, that the three words are substantially interchange-
able. I discussed this question with an engineer once and he indicated 
that the three words were substantially the same in meaning but that 
by ordinary usage pulverizing implied a finer degree of crushing. In 
any event, anyone who has ever had a chance to observe a crushing 
operation will know that fine particles begin to appear as soon as the 
operation of crushing starts. Crushed material has to be sorted by size 
to be saleable in most cases. 
In the uranium case it does not appear that the proposed position 
of the Internal Revenue Service is tenable. In my opinion as long as 
the Internal Revenue Code states that concentrating is an ordinary 
treatment process normally applied by mine owners or operators the 
gross income from the property would have to be the value of the ore 
after the concentrating process if the ore was sold in that form. 
The limestone-for-cement cases are important for a number of 
reasons. In the first place, the courts uniformly held that there was no 
real commercially marketable mineral product short of the finished 
cement. In the second place the record showed that all of the com-
panies tried to sell all their cement in bulk and only bagged what could 
only be sold in such form and, except in the Monolith case where it 
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was not a real issue, the courts found that the bagging was a necessary 
process to obtain a commercially marketable product. In the third 
place, except as to the Monolith case where it was not a real issue, the 
discounts offered were to be treated as cash discounts not deductible 
from gross income of the property so long as their purpose was to 
encourage prompt payment. This was held even though the discounts 
were more substantial than in many businesses. 
The fire-clay case is of considerable interest and deals with the 
concept that a manufacturing process may, in effect, be classed as an 
ordinary treatment process if there is no commercially marketable 
mineral product without such treatment. The court accepted the 
evidence that large amounts of raw clay were sold but set forth the 
requirement that sales at a profit must be available before a process 
is excluded. 
The position of the Internal Revenue Service has been and is that 
of requiring every producer to value his output at the lowest form 
anyone anywhere sells any product. The Service does not regard it 
important, as in the Cannelton case, that a producer had a mining cost 
of $2.40 per ton compared with a selling price of $1.60 to $1.90 per ton 
for competitors. It appears to take the position every producer must 
regard his gross income to be $1.60 to $1.90 per ton irrespective of 
costs, markets, or other factors. Such a position, if upheld, would 
mean that Cannelton would be considered to have sustained a loss on 
its mining operation of $0.50 to $0.80 per ton and a manufacturing 
profit of $0.50 to $0.80 a ton greater than its over-all profit. If its 
properties were discovered and therefore had no tax basis the taxpayer 
would be entitled to no deduction for depletion, either percentage or 
cost. This result is contrary to the general premise on which per-
centage depletion is allowable. 
In March 1959, hearings were held before the Ways and Means 
Committee of Congress. Representatives of the Treasury Department 
presented their position as to cut-off points. Mr. David Lindsay pre-
sented some data regarding depletion allowable to owners or operators 
of iron ore deposits. He stated that iron ore was saleable at $8.00 per 
ton and two tons of iron ore represent the equivalent of one ton of pig 
iron. He further stated that one steel producer is claiming the. right 
to depletion on a selling price of $295 for one ton of structural steel 
bolts. The iron ore producer would have a depletion deduction of 
$2.40 (15 per cent of $16.00) whereas the producer who carried his ore 
to the structural bolt stage would have a depletion deduction of $44.25 
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per ton (15 per cent of $295). This situation is the basis for his demand 
that a uniform base be applied to all in an industry. It may be con-
ceded it is difficult to support the claim of the structural bolt manu-
facturer but the proposal of Mr. Lindsay would penalize any producer 
but the most efficient one in the industry and the one best situated 
from a market position. Other producers presumably could not com-
pete effectively and their profit margins would probably be lower. 
No one likes to see provisions in the Internal Revenue Code that 
are restrictive but it is just as inequitable to have broad provisions 
that can create hardships and unintended results without any way of 
affording correction or relief. 
COMPUTATION PROBLEMS 
After it has been determined that a cut-off point exists it then 
becomes necessary to determine gross income of the ore or mineral at 
such point and also the net income from the property at such point. 
If the cut-off point is one that provides a saleable product the 
determination of gross income from the property may be made by 
reference to such market prices if the situation is realistic. The regu-
lations also provide that, in the absence of a representative market 
price, gross income from the property may be computed under the 
proportionate-cost theory. This approach requires obtaining the ratio 
of costs at the cut-off point to total costs and applying such ratio to the 
selling price of the product. 
Consideration of this latter method will make it clear that a pro-
ducer who has high primary costs wil l fare better than a lower-cost, 
more efficient producer. Let us assume that for two producers the 
total cost of production is $2.00 per unit. If producer A has a cost at 
the cut-off point of $0.40 per unit his gross income from the property 
would be 20 per cent of the total selling price whereas if producer B 
has a cost at the cut-off point of $0.60 per unit his gross income from 
the property would be 30 per cent of the total selling price. In a com-
petitive market the selling prices might be very similar so that B's 
deduction for depletion would be 50 per cent greater than that of A . 
This is a simple example and it might be that in actual practice total 
costs of the two would not be similar. Furthermore the result might 
be distorted by the 50 per cent of net income limitation. 
One wil l find that an advantage can be had by increasing pre-cut-
off point costs. It is realized that this point may require a change in 
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the accounting practices of taxpayers but there are some possibilities. 
It might be perfectly proper to take accelerated depreciation with 
respect to assets used in operations prior to the cut-off point and 
straight-line depreciation for assets used subsequent to the cut-off 
point. 
In one case I have found that the records of a taxpayer carried all 
laboratory costs in one account. Analysis was made of the laboratory 
operation and it was found that a substantial part was attributable to 
control of ore quality and other projects prior to the cut-off point. 
Benefit was obtained by properly allocating such costs. 
Sometimes taxpayers are conducting a research program that has 
as its purpose the development of new products. Such costs can be 
frequently treated as non-mining and by exclusion from costs beyond 
the cut-off point can be handled so as to increase the deduction for 
depletion. 
Sometimes a study of the manner of allocating overhead will 
reveal that owing to changed operating conditions the method should 
be changed. In a proper situation this can benefit a taxpayer. 
Taxpayers sometimes incur expenses that are purely financial. 
Proper consideration of these items might result in increasing the 
limitation based on 50 per cent of net income from the property. For 
example, a taxpayer might acquire a plant for the conduct of a purely 
manufacturing activity such as the fabricating activities of some of 
the large integrated companies. If it is necessary to borrow funds for 
the construction of such new plant it would appear feasible to segre-
gate such funds, use them for the construction project, and treat the 
interest thereon as an expense not entering into the depletion compu-
tation. 
The recent court decision in the Monolith Portland Cement Com-
pany case which was decided in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
suggests a possibility that should be explored. The Court held that 
the taxpayer could not include the charge to customers for placing 
cement in bags as a part of its gross income from the property. Faced 
with this situation, the taxpayer was able to show that the cost of such 
bagging activity exceeded the charge to customers and by submitting 
to a cut-off point prior to the bagging operation the taxpayer was able 
to increase its net income from the property. Its depletion deduction 
was based on 50 per cent of net income from the property. Perhaps 
a careful study by other taxpayers of their costs would produce bene-
fits of the sort obtained by Monolith. 
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I have run across other instances where a taxpayer was arguing 
that he had to process part of his output in order to sell it. His claim 
was disputed by the Internal Revenue Service and on study of the 
situation it was discovered that net income from the property did not 
increase proportionately to the added costs. The taxpayer found out 
he had a greater depletion deduction by accepting an earlier cut-off 
point and treating all his output as though sold at such cut-off point. 
Each one of you present should consider the cost-accounting 
practices of his own business and approach this problem in an analyti-
cal way in order to discover any practices that have adversely affected 
the depletion deduction. 
SUMMARY 
In conclusion it can be said that cut-off points are a real contro-
versial item. On the one hand we have the Internal Revenue Service 
asking for a uniform cut-off point on an industry-wide basis, not 
necessarily with regard to economic realities, and the taxpayers asking 
for differing cut-off points according to the economic facts of life. So 
far the courts for the most part have been inclined to recognize the 
requirement that a commercially saleable product must be obtained 
before the cut-off point will be recognized. Perhaps the Supreme 
Court will resolve the matter by its decision in the forthcoming 
Cannelton case or perhaps its decision will only make one of the partic-
ipants seek legislative relief. 
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